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What many initially defined as the Arab Spring had among its numerous effects 
that of changing people’s perception, particularly in the West, about the Arab 
world.  Up to that cathartic moment, this part of the world had survived in the 2
Western imaginary as being in the grip of some sort of spell that had slowed 
down the flow of time and transformed people into docile citizens incapable of 
reacting to the authoritarian rulers who had been luxuriating in golden palaces for 
such a long time.  It wasn’t simply the way the West looked at the Arab world 3
that had changed, but people’s self-perception and understanding of their political 
lives underwent through a meaningful transformation. Thus, the Arab uprisings 
represented the beginning of a new chapter for this region’s history, one marked 
by the “entrance of the masses into the realm of the rulership over their own his-
tory”.  4
The academic world and policymaking circles watched the unfolding of the 
events of 2011 with genuine surprise. No one had been able to predict the out-
break of the uprisings. After all, the autocratic structure of the state, repression 
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and social control over the population, in tandem with a lack of practical and 
conscious preparedness of people to engage politically and culturally in changing 
the ruling institutions was believed to characterize most of the countries in the 
Arab world. In this regard, Syria would often be thought of as a “successful” 
story of an authoritarian government, which had been able to inculcate respect, 
cult and fear of the ruler and to transform the citizenry into a “disciplined soci-
ety” of non-thinking subjects.  The myth of authoritarian resilience permeated 5
scholarly works, focused on all those mechanisms that contributed to the stability 
and longevity of the existing order, while ignoring the everyday forms of opposi-
tion that were emerging “from below”.    6
Academic literature on pre- 2011 Syria  was mostly concerned with the structure 
of the regime, the new political alliances, the security organs and foreign policy. 
Few scholars have looked at the human agent factor and  the grassroots trans-
formations that were occurring at the level of civil society. The analysis favoured 
a top-down framing; in other words, it privileged elites and formal politics rather 
than micropolitics and the contentious capacity of everyday life.  The outset of 7
the Syrian uprising was a clear indication that little attention had been paid to 
people’s (in)tolerance of their government, their organizational capacity and civil 
resistance and, even more significantly to the enabling effects of information and 
communication technologies. In a similar manner, the same silence on civic act-
ivism that was laid on pre-revolutionary Syria has characterized hitherto the nar-
rative of the Syrian war, where the grassroots initiatives of popular politics and 
civic resistance remain mostly voiceless.   
On these grounds, one needs to modestly admit the presence of scholarly lacunae 
in  the analysis of the Syrian case, which need to be filled in order to prevent the 
reiteration of cultural prejudices and academic presumption and to interpret the 
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recent developments in Syria and in the rest of the region correctly. Free from the 
dictum of Orientalism and tuned with the specificities of the context, there is a 
need to bring back in the dynamics of political contestation and mobilization of 
ordinary people, who with their quiet practices are capable of silent but signific-
ant social changes. In Asef Bayat’s words, the MENA region requires the devel-
opment of a “scholarship of silence”, that is to say a study of the voiceless, of 
those individuals who operate outside formal institutions and though lacking in-
stitutional capacities to exert pressure, represent a crucial  challenge to those who 
exert power.  8
In light of what has just been said, this paper aims at presenting a more inclusive 
and multifaceted account of the Syrian uprising by offering a new reading of its 
narrative. This narrative emphasis the long-term growth of civic resilience and 
mobilization in the years that preceded the spark of the revolt in 2011 and its 
formational role in the midst of what has turned into a civil war. Conversely to 
what the tendency of  area specialists has been this far, that is to say to delineate 
what made Arab rulers so exceptionally successful, this paper tells the successful 
story of civil society activism, which has been able to grow within the restrictions 
imposed by an autocratic regime, namely the Syrian one.   9
Western journalistic reports and, not rarely, academic literature, though framing 
the Syrian insurrection as a revolt “from below”, of ordinary men and women 
fighting for dignity and freedom, have been unable to represent them fairly. The 
narrative of the Syrian revolt, like that of neighbouring countries, has been cap-
tured from an “above perspective”, still strongly ingrained in Orientalist legacy 
and Eurocentric omniscient presumption. Such an approach tends to analyse 
Middle East politics against the normative background of the democratic “free 
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world”, therefore using comparative parameters which belong to the Western 
world and that can hardly fit other contexts, like the Arab region.   10
Before attempting to give voice to the Syrian people and their making of the up-
rising, this paper will critically examine the mainstream narrative of the Syrian 
revolt by looking at how it has been portrayed by most Western media and schol-
ars, pointing out what has instead been misinterpreted, minimized or neglected. 
In doing so, it challenges the Eurocentric mediatic narrative of the uprising on a 
linguistic, thematic and methodological level. The second section of the paper 
will instead present examples of civil society activism and popular expedience 
both before and during the uprising. The Syrian uprising is thus told by lowering 
the perspective of the narrative and casting light on what lies “below” the surface 
of both formal politics and official Western eyes. Hence, the Syrian revolt is not 
perceived as the outcome of a “moment of madness” or of echoing the regional 
mantra which chanted “the people want the fall of the regime”, but as the last 
step of a long-term process, which found the perfect timing to burst in March of 
2011.  11
Where it all started: the emergence of Arab exceptionalism 
Before 2011 a relevant majority of Arabs used to blame themselves for the stale-
mate and passive acceptance of the historical and political circumstances in 
which they lived.  Others would pin the blame on the United States, which is 12
regularly said to have backed authoritarian rulers in order to defend geopolitical 
interests and, more specifically, to protect Israel, to ensure a secure supply of oil 
and to curtail any Islamist threat.  The West, on the other hand, would justify the 13
“Arab exception” by simply suggesting that these societies were not “ready” for 
democracy, because of their patriarchal systems which predisposed them to un-
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democratic rule and because Islam was seen as inherently incompatible with 
democracy.   14
For Arabs, only the past seemed to be a source of pride, albeit mixed with an af-
tertaste of saudade for the bygones. In fact, in the popular narratives, the glory 
days seem to be connected to two precise historical periods: the one that saw the 
flourishing of Islamic culture (beginning of the VII century) with the revelation 
of the prophet Muhammad and the nahḍa (rebirth), which coincided with 
European penetration into the region (XIX century) bringing social, political and 
literary renaissance.  Yet a long period of decadence (inhitāt) characterized not 15
just the time between these two historical moments, but also what came after the 
failure of the colonial experience and the advent to power of strong autocrats in 
the region. The durability of the autocratic regimes and their apparent patronizing 
societies conveyed the idea of an Arab world unprepared for change. The MENA 
region had become the icon of some form of implicit or explicit exceptionalism, 
which lasted at least until September 11, 2001. It was no coincidence that for 
many political scientists, the democratic wave that swept from Latin America to 
Europe and East Asia in the last few decades, had completely skipped the Arab 
shores.  16
Deep incredulity was felt by the political, academic and media circles when the 
popular uprising broke out in Tunisia and unexpectedly developed into a regional 
phenomenon. Where did the uprisings arise from? Did Arabs “awake” from this 
long sleep and decide to pour into the streets in a moment of madness, or had the 
West been unaware of the transformations taking place in the MENA when it 
erupted in 2011? Who was it that was actually sleeping? Did this mean that Arabs 
were no longer an exception? Indeed, have they ever really been one?  
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Several scholars recited a mea culpa for having missed the Arab revolts. Gregory 
Gause modestly admitted that political scientists like him had been inebriated by 
the myth of authoritarian stability, failing to capture the “forces for change that 
were bubbling from below, and at time above, the surface of Arab politics”.  17
Indeed, the myth of change of regimes, often passes through change in regimes.  
Syria, in this sense, fits the pattern perfectly: a country ruled for over forty years 
by an authoritarian regime, which suddenly erupts in unexpected popular con-
testations. Having said this, was the Syrian uprising so surprising? It is not any-
more if the story of political change is told through a narrative attentive of civic 
engagement and socio-political activism, which led to the 15th of March 2011 and 
the start of the Syrian chapter of the Arab uprisings. 
Mediating of the Syrian uprising: mangling the narrative? 
After three years of turmoil in the Arab world, the fate of the uprisings no longer 
seems predictable. If at the beginning many hastened to foresee the outcome of 
these revolts, now it is clear how the unpredictability of their outburst persists in 
the inability to forecast their outcome.  The euphoria of the first months evapor-
ated into disillusion; the colourful and symbolic definitions that had been coined 
to define the 2011 upheavals like “Arab revolutions”, the “Arab Spring”, the 
“Arab Awakening” and “Arab tsunami” made room for new definitions, contain-
ing the sense of scepticism and disappointment felt, like that of “Arab Winter”, 
the “Islamist Winter”, the “Winter of Discontent”.  Once again the idea of the 18
impossibility to change the Arab world seemed to have returned. The failure in 
understanding the events on the ground and those that predated them reverberates 
in the narrative adopted by most of the media (international and local), politicians 
and often academics, who seem to keep readopting the idea of “Arab exception-
alism”.   Indeed all the expressions that have been used to define the 2011 up19 -
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heavals, whether in their initial promising phase or in the subsequent disillu-
sioned one, contain a sense of passivity, of fatal consequence of a period that 
comes and goes, which minimizes the intensity and courage of all of those who 
participated and believed in the revolutionary change. Indeed, the same idea of an 
“Arab Awakening” or “Arab Spring”, is a linguistic escamotage to reiterate the 
idea of sleepy backwardness and (dis)ability to progress among the Arabs. The 
idea of “spring” itself suggests the teleological succession of cycle, whereby the 
authoritarian winter is followed by a liberal spring, in which the people particip-
ate only as surfers of the tide of history. In particular, when referred to the Syrian 
uprising this terminology seems to recall those initial promising months of the 
newly “elected” president Bashar al-Asad in 2000, which had already gone down 
in history as the “Damascus Spring” and which were followed by the so-called 
“Damascus Winter”, a clampdown on activists, civil society actors and organiza-
tions and a slowdown of the promised reforms.  The reutilization of the same 20
terminology to denominate the Syrian upheavals of 2011 looms a dark shadow, as 
if expecting a similar fate. On top of that, it demonstrates how the last decade has 
not really been understood by most analysts. Syria was rigidly categorized as an 
authoritarian regime, which had reduced citizens to a “disciplined society” of 
non-thinking subjects, passive perpetuators of the regime’s stability.  This type 21
of erroneous analysis has removed the notion of human agency for Syrian cit-
izens and has not perceived that the “Damascus Spring” of 2000 did not vanish 
with the government crackdown, but it just scaled down and lurked below the 
surface, finding new ways of survival. 
The orientalist legacy emerges not just through the use of epithets to name the 
upheavals but through a skilful linguistic and thematic choice of the terms and 
tones used, particularly in the media but also in political talks and academic pro-
duction. The most common and effective way has been that of emphasizing the 
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diversity between “they” (Arabs and Muslims) and “us” (Western); and the adop-
tion of tones at times pathetic, more appropriate to the description of exotic top-
ics than everyday civil resistance.  Yet what is most extraordinary is the adop22 -
tion of such a narrative not just by the West but also by local news outposts and 
elites. After all, Edward Said did say that Orientalism is not just an attitude of the 
West towards the Middle East, but it is also absurdly appropriated and interpreted 
by local elites and experts.  The late Fouad Ajami who recognizes Arab excep23 -
tionalism as an actual phenomenon and attributes the causes to its intrinsic cul-
ture, is a powerful representative of this attitude, as emerges in his most recent 
book The Syrian rebellion.  Along the same lines, the Syrian-British journalist 24
and academic Halla Diyab provoked a wide debate after her program was aired 
on BBC One, where she openly objected to the entrance of Syrian refugees to 
Britain, where they would face cultural barriers such as not being able to speak 
English and would be a burden on British tax payers.  It seems that after the dis25 -
appointment of not being understood and not being fairly represented by the 
West, the Syrian people are also being mocked by their own experts and repres-
entatives, who with their westernized attitude are presenting the cause of their 
own people wrongly. 
In addition to the employment of specific terminology and modalities of phrasing 
the narrative, the emphasis on some themes, at the expenses of others, perpetu-
ates Eurocentric stereotypes. The emphasis on the new generations and the use of 
new media technology is one paradigmatic case. Hence, the Arab uprisings have 
gone down in history as the “Facebook, Twitter or YouTube revolutions” given 
the prominent role that these tools had in the outbreak of these revolts, promoting 
dissent, breaking the  barrier of fear and coordinating the logistics of the up-
heavals. The Syrian revolution has been defined as “the most well documented 
revolution in human history”  given the high reliance on social media and on 26
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YouTube to coordinate action and ensure that certain atrocities would not go un-
noticed as had been the case in the past.  However, the emphasis that the media 27
and partly academic literature placed on the binomial digital media and new gen-
erations conveys the impression that the Syrian uprising and the neighbouring 
ones were caused more by Western technology rather than by the people. In this 
regard, Harvard Professor Tarak Barkawi asserted: “To listen to the hype about 
social networking websites and the Egyptian revolution, one would think it was 
Silicon Valley and not the Egyptian people who overthrew Mubarak”.  Unlike 28
traditional ways of fighting, these tools transform the fight into a peaceful one 
(read: non-violent, no bullets) and make the younger generations similar to “us” , 
redeeming that image that the West had created of the Arab world, under-
developed, dangerous, chaotic, violent, passive and in need of help (from the 
West). In short, they discharged these new modern generations of the Arab world 
of the epithet of being “terrorists”. This type of reading asserts that the new Arab 
generations are “modern” in that they are IT-savvy, “peaceful” as capable of us-
ing their intelligence rather than their force to counter injustice, at odds with oth-
er fundamentalists, dangerous and instigators of terror. Many interpreted the 
ideology of the Arab youth as inspired by the ideas of non-violence theorist Gene 
Sharp, of whom they had never probably heard.   29
One needs to mention that up to 2011 the Arab world and Syria in particular, was 
classified as underdeveloped in terms of Internet connectivity and use of digital 
tools when compared to the Western world. Syria was the last country in the re-
gion to allow Internet access to the public (2000) and among the one with the 
lowest rates of Internet penetration and ICT literacy.  How can these data ex30 -
plain the high reliance on new technology after 2011? Did Syrians become IT-
savvy overnight? Statistics may not be able to assess technology’s democratic 
potential. As Deborah Wheeler observes, counting the number of Internet users 
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within a society tells us little about how such technology is leveraged by people 
in their everyday life.  In a context like Syria, statistics have failed to convey the 31
exact numbers of Internet surfers, given the predominant access of people at In-
ternet cafés, (due to the expensive cost of computers in relation to average in-
come) and the number of family members who often access the Internet on the 
same account.  Not only, but the number of those accessing the Internet does not 32
communicate the index of social interaction that a convivial environment like an 
Internet café creates to those who continue on-line conversations or news discov-
eries with the offline community of friends and peers. Furthermore, to transform 
the Internet and digital media into empowerment tools, it is not necessary for all 
of the citizens to be connected and equally IT-savvy. What is necessary is a group 
of particularly IT gifted activists who play the role of “bridge leaders”, as ex-
plained by the “two-step flow theory”.  The bridge or opinion leaders are cit33 -
izens who with a more literate understanding of the media context, connect the 
news to the larger group of the population which does not have access to the In-
ternet or to any other form of alternative media. A whole new generation of IT-
savvy and techies grew up in the years that predated the Syrian uprising, like 
Rami Nakhle, Razan Ghazzawi, Bassel Khartabil,  becoming extremely useful in 
keeping the population conscious of the state’s wrong-doings and transforming 
years of repression into acts of public resentment in 2011. This class of digital 
activists had played a fundamental role in raising civic awareness and stimulating 
political and social participation before 2011 and afterwards as essential social 
connectors and coordinators.  With the outbreak of the upheavals, they have been 
the focus of the West’s attention, embodying the positive results of IT media lit-
eracy and the adoption of Western values. Nonetheless, they were more suited to 
the political paradigms of a Western taste, than necessarily representing the Syri-
an people. As Adel Iskander points out, others have been quite active online, al-
though they might belong to the working class, might be mature in age and func-
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tionally-illiterate, but who are still willing to have a say.  Yet, they don’t fit into 34
the paradigm of the “Facebook generation”; they don’t seem to have much in 
common with Wael Ghonim and the likes, and have therefore been omitted by the 
story-tellers.  
Western news coverage has also tended to determine and influence people’s 
viewpoint of what is right and wrong through the skilful coverage of the uprising 
as a black and white picture of heroes and anti-heroes. This applies to all the 
countries affected by the upheavals, but it is more evident in the case of Syria. 
When the uprising turned into a civil war and difficulties for reporters arose, the 
media coverage proved to be misleading and no longer reliable. The Syrian con-
flict has been reduced to a polarized struggle, of black and white pawns, antagon-
ist/protagonist, peaceful/violent, where the forces of good and evil tackle each 
other, respectively identified as the people and the regime, with no middle 
ground. Thereby the struggle has been described as a peaceful flock of protestors 
demanding full citizenship rights and constitutional guarantees, facing an author-
itarian regime that suppresses protests with brutal violence. If one considers the 
initial phase of the upheavals, we see how people poured into the streets, asking 
for reforms, rather than radical changes, and acting peacefully. When protests 
started to grow in size, raising the stakes with more explicit requests, the regime 
responded by brutally crushing them and the protestors themselves did not, for all 
obvious reasons, stay peaceful. This did not receive much coverage by most news 
agencies, which preferred to keep the image of protestors as peaceful, victims 
rather than agents capable of resistance.  
This technique was not peculiar to Syria only.  However, in Syria, more than in 35
any other country, this bipolar narrative was incorrect from the very beginning 
and became more fragmented with time. In Syria, the population did not all unite 
to oppose the regime. Many stayed loyal to the regime, whether out of fear or 
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genuine support. However, Western media did not favour such nuances, which 
would have disoriented people’s understanding of the Syrian conflict and blurred 
the line separating good from evil (and out of foreign policy imperatives).  
Only alternative sources on the Internet are presenting a 360 ° view, even disclos-
ing grimmer pictures, like the increasingly violent rebel fighters carrying out 
crimes, comparable to the ones committed by the regime. Many would probably 
remember the video of the Syrian rebel commander, now known as “Abu- Sakkar 
the cannibal”, who cut out the heart of a fallen enemy soldier and ate it while 
looking into the camera.  Many and more of these quivering images are avail36 -
able on the web, contrasting with what the media is trying to say and largely suc-
ceeding in saying. As a consequence, Western media are now struggling to adopt 
their initial coverage of the Syrian uprising to the most recent shifts in popularity 
of the regime and the rebels, making the narrative confusing and, at times, con-
tradictory. 
Taking into account what has just been said, how reliable has the coverage of the 
uprising been? How can Western prejudices ever dissipate if they are ingrained in 
the media and academic narrative as we have just mentioned? Moreover, the 
traceability and ethics of news are often at the mercy of market forces. Western 
media have been particularly careful in selecting newsworthy stories, meaning 
news that would guarantee profit, the making of the tale, which in terms of sales 
means showing the tragedy, the number of deaths that occur daily, picturing bare-
foot children waiting in a queue in the snow for some bread or the tears of a 
mother mourning her son’s death. Syria has been the case par excellence, given 
the extreme conditions in which news would be sold to the market. The “spectac-
ular” is what is most desirable and compensated by media outlets: bombing, gun-
fire, victims. Not civil disobedience. As clarified by an activist running a media 
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centre near Homs , “Western channels only want to know about the numbers of 
the dead, not their names, not who is left alive and is struggling to stay alive. Do 
we count more when we are dead than when we are alive?”.  The insensibility to 37
the tragedy has been expressed in many ways by the media, as in the case of a 
BBC reportage on the Houla massacre (May 25, 2012) which reused photos from 
the war in Iraq, as if every death was tantamount to another.  This type of in38 -
formation is not just non-instructive; it is also harmful, given the high risk of 
trivializing the cause. Those same images and news lose their power once they 
become a daily scene, making people accustomed, insensible and requiring media 
outlets to find other more moving ones.  
In Syria citizens have turned into journalists, as a result of decades of partisan 
news and the lack of professional journalists covering protests and their repres-
sion and the extreme difficulty for foreign media to operate.  Armed with cell 39
phones, cameras and laptops, they film the everyday civil resistance and pass it 
on to international media outlets to keep the world aware of their cause. The 
voice of citizen journalists, though representing a precious element of an “in-
sider” and in many cases the only voice in non-accessible circumstances, may be 
lacking in trustworthiness and professional ethics. Many citizen journalists and 
grassroots activists in Syria believe that their role is to “protect” the revolution 
through the media. This is what emerged from a conversation with a number of 
citizen activists in August 2013, at the end of a media training funded by 
European organizations in Gaziantep (on the Turkish border with Syria). One of 
them firmly stated: “My aim is to use the media to help my people to topple 
Bashar. Why shouldn’t I serve the interests of my people and of myself? I have 
been silenced for my whole life by the regime, now I need to have my say.”  40
Many citizen activists are now being trained by international organizations in 
neighbouring countries or liberated areas on subjects of media ethics, codes of 
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conduct and are provided with the necessary tools to make their reports. Some 
return to the war zones to report and are often named “revolutionaries of the 
trenches” (thowar al-khanadeq), others leave for safer locations abroad and co-
ordinate the work of those inside the country, conversely earning the reputation 
of “hotel revolutionaries” (thowar al-fanadiq), more aware of Western sensibilit-
ies in terms of news. 
The uprisings have been reported not only by citizen journalists but by an in-
creasing number of freelancers operating inside the country. Freelancers go to 
battle sites for one or two days, just for a quick hit and give people the idea of 
what is going on, while putting their life at stake.  Freelancers have become the 41
new precarious workers of the information labour market, with their short-term 
contracts, at the mercy of economic and political constraints, which inevitably 
translates into a loss of liberty. One example that speaks for itself is the one of 42
the Syrian activist Danny Dayem, working for CNN, who was caught staging a 
false reportage on Syria using extras as actors and asking them to let the gunfire 
sound in order to create a more credible war-like setting.   Beside freelancers, 43
news organizations also rely on commissioned journalists, competent in terms of 
professionalism and ethics.  Paradoxically however, most of these journalists 44
tend to lack a deep knowledge of the region and its local culture. They often 
don’t speak the language and reside in safety zones, five-star hotels and walk 
around with security men and a translator.  In these circumstances, is profes45 -
sionalism relevant and, above all, do cultural differences effect knowledge? How 
reliable is news of events seen unfolding from the balcony of a TV station? Real 
life lies in the streets, in the murals that people write on walls, in the chat that a 
shopkeeper would like to have with you and would try to have if only you spoke 
his language, in the words that people shout when protesting, in living the lives 
of those involved.  
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In a context like the one in Syria and the difficulties to access information, the 
media have become strong instruments of power, capable of greatly influencing 
public opinion and academic production, by choosing the more “appropriate” 
information and forcing moral judgement, by materializing and shaping certain 
views that with time become reality. As noted by Herman and Chomsky, the me-
dia are able to spread propaganda and to craft realities by simply selecting the 
news and relying on experts and influential figures.  The risk is that instead of 46
conveying unbiased information, they reproduce the falsehoods and interests of 
those in power and more sadly, they subjugate academic production to their will. 
Paradoxically Syria has been subjected to this manipulation twice, by the West 
and by the regime. 
The denial of human agency: a glance at Syrian civil society activism 
The narrative of the uprising stressed the idea of a revolution “from below” of 
ordinary people who with courage and cohesion have become formidable oppon-
ents of authoritarian rulers. For once, the narrative did not err, insofar as it then 
diverted the attention from the actual protagonists. In fact, while the uprisings 
have been described as the outcome of a “bottom up” movement of ordinary cit-
izens actively organized to depose despotic regimes, reporting their struggle has 
tended to be that of a “from above” perspective. The ‘revolution’ of ordinary men 
and women, has failed, not in the streets, but in the voice of those who narrated 
the story. After all, it is understandable that the real actors of the upheavals are 
not represented or given voice, having been ignored by most of the media and 
academic production in the years predating the initial spark in 2011.  
As Samer Yazbek, a renowned Syrian writer and journalist argues, the media 
don’t seem to see the civil society initiatives of the uprising; they don’t talk about 
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the extraordinary art of civil resistance and activism that Syrians have been cap-
able of carrying out, despite the violent conflict.  The media seem to be obsessed 47
only with statistics of the death toll, the refugees and of those in need of human-
itarian aid. Not a word is spoken about the revolutionary art, drawing, graffiti, 
cinema, songs, literature, poetry that have emerged since the early days in De-
ra’a. Particularly interesting is the creative outdoor campaign that Syrians carried 
out in response to a regime’s advertising campaign, which had put up colourful 
billboards, showing a raised hand and slogans like: “whether progressive or con-
servative, I’m with the law”, “whether girl or boy, I’m with the law”.  Citizens 48
responded to this Orwellian atmosphere by hanging like-posters but new slogans 
like “I lost my shoes”, suggesting it had been lost throwing to the dictator, or “An 
mu hindi!” ( “I’m not Indian”), a politically incorrect expression meaning “I’m 
not stupid”.  The regime responded with new posters, which tried to appeal to a 49
middle-way form of nationalism, by simply saying “I’m with Syria. My demands 
are your demands”. Yet, Syrians did not stay quiet and, with a marker, deleted the 
second part of the slogan and substituted it with “my demands are freedom.”  50
Not much coverage was given to the “revolutionary” organizations that have 
sprouted up at the micro level in Syria, like the local committees and local coun-
cils. These organizations have emerged by the thought of the Syrian anarchist 
named Omar Aziz, who had died before becoming the target of Western media 
attention.  The local committees embrace all segments of the society, horizont51 -
ally-structured and dealing with the provision of basic services, coordinating with 
the local councils and with armed resistance groups and maintaining security. Not 
a word has been said about the incredible self-management by the masses in the 
city of Raqqa, involved in cultural activities like the theatrical performances 
mocking the regime and the Islamists; the organizations of baccalaureate exams 
entirely based on the initiative of volunteers; the creation of centres, involved in 
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social issues like youth occupation and the treatment of psychological 
disorders.  Nothing has been said about the incredible stories of a group of Syri52 -
an doctors, of different ethnic and religious affiliations, who work side by side in 
the area north of Aleppo, moving from town to town, despite the intense shelling, 
to provide medical assistance to everyone, regardless of political and religious 
creed.  This is a ‘revolutionary’ example of creating a ‘we’ that cuts across lines 53
of cleavage based on fear, ignorance, religious or ethnic diversity. This is the ex-
ample of a “social glue” which Syrians have been able to achieve, Asad’s 
stranglehold notwithstanding and which no foreign support/intervention would be 
able to implement. Not even the Union for Free Syrian Students found much 
coverage in Western media, despite being the most relevant youth group organiz-
ation developing civil resistance in the country and organizing initiatives in and 
off-campuses, like boycotting to sit at exams in the name of their classmates de-
tained by the regime; staging flash demonstrations in central areas of the capital 
and raising the independence flag in public places.  Even more interesting is the 54
counter-elections campaign that citizens have carried out to oppose the presiden-
tial elections staged by the regime for the 4th of June 2014. While the regime had 
filled the country with billboards supporting Bashar under the slogan of “Togeth-
er” (sawa in Arabic) and describing him as the “destroyer of crime”, the “pro-
tector of minorities”, the “man of safety and security”, citizens decided to pro-
mote a counter-awareness campaign by distributing leaflets in the streets and oc-
cupying the cyberspace with satirical anti-Bashar posters and slogans saying the 
“elections of blood”, “lower your voice”, “together we will bury him”, “together 
we kill”, “together we destroy”.  These are only a few among the wide array of 55
initiatives that citizens have been carrying out since the start of the uprising. 
Many would probably argue that these activities are not conscious political acts 
of a structured collective group, but rather the expression of spontaneous and in-
dividual practices, driven by the necessity to survive in times of war. However 
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these everyday forms of resistance, though strongly influenced by the frame of 
the war, they nonetheless represent a “movement in itself”, characterized by 
people conscious of their doing, articulating their actions, aims and 
justifications.  Moreover, despite the clampdown of the regime, these practices 56
engender social changes at the local and raise social awareness on malpractices 
of both the regime and most recently, of the radical Islamist cells operating in the 
country.  
Civil society activism in Syria is not the outcome of the uprising: it is deep 
rooted in the decade that predated the spark of the revolt. Nonetheless, the same 
disinterest towards civil society activism and everyday resistance that is found in 
the mainstream narrative of the Syrian uprising replicates the attitude of scholars 
before 2011. Small steps towards a citizenry reawakening had been perceived by 
many analysts, but their role was minimized in the light of a regional tendency of 
autocrats to “upgrade authoritarianism” in the past decade.  In other words, the 57
growth of civil society was interpreted as a way for the regime to relinquish its 
social commitment to non-state organizations and conversely assume more con-
trol of society. If this seemed to work initially, with time the promotion of indi-
vidual initiative, self-help, NGOs utterly translated into a loss of political space 
for the regime.  Salam Kawakibi, while vehemently asserting the evil pragmat58 -
ism and stronghold of the Syrian regime, points out how the plan might have got 
out of hand, with unexpected consequences.  The survival tactics of “moderniz59 -
ing authoritarianism” as a way to hold on to power, resulted in a risky card to 
play. Ironically, the country’s bid for modernization, which contemplated, inter 
alia, the expansion of non-state organizations and the opening of the country to 
satellite dishes and the Internet, enhanced the potential of the upheaval. The dec-
ade preceding the uprising provided fertile soil, nurturing values of citizenship 
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and civil engagement, which became admittedly anti-regime in the Spring of 
2011. 
The literature about Syrian civil society activism seems to recount only those 
events that were manifest and politically oriented, those born during the Damas-
cus Spring and in its aftermath. This includes the drafting of the ‘Statement of the 
99’ (2000), the ‘Damascus declaration’ (2005) and the setting of political forums 
like the National Dialogue Forum and the Jamal Atassi Forum, where with an 
increasingly demanding tone, intellectuals, opposition figures and secular politic-
al parties asked for profound social and political reforms.  By contrast, the 60
second half of the last decade saw the emergence of a new generation of civil 
society activists who did not necessarily have a political record, but who were 
merely engaged in social and economic activities and in connecting citizens. Pre-
cisely because of their largely apolitical and low-profile  form of mobilisation, 
they have been belittled or simply ignored as non-destabilizing. 
Since 2005, Syrians led a vivid cultural life through discussion forums, sit-ins 
and organized human rights demonstrations. The growing numbers of civil soci-
ety organizations (both NGOs and GONGOs), became a means for the govern-
ment to outsource services which the state could not afford to provide. While at 
first this strategy seemed to work, allowing the state to keep control of the new 
civil society actors, over time these organizations widened their activities and 
audience, beyond the regime’s direct control.  Many of these organizations, op61 -
erating under the administrative umbrella of the Syria Trust for Development, 
funded by First Lady Asma Al-Assad, addressed the younger generations by 
promoting learning campaigns, offering scholarships for underprivileged stu-
dents, developing IT literacy and values of citizenship among the youth.  These 62
programs not only got the blessing of  foreign partners but also established new 
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ventures with Western and international organizations, including the UN agencies 
and a number of development agencies, which by osmosis contributed to increase 
professionalism and to expose the younger generations to concepts of critical 
thinking and civic empowerment.   63
Next to these type of more structured civic activism, the Internet produced 
thought-provoking examples of civic engagement. Indeed the cyberspace became 
for many a forum of discussion, information, campaign awareness, effecting 
people’s sense of responsibility and their way of thinking, as well as scrutinizing 
the regime’s code of conduct. Even though the role of the Internet and informa-
tion technology requires a more in-depth analysis, it is nonetheless important to 
mention some successful campaigns that have been carried out online. Among 
the most effective campaigns that citizens have carried out online one needs to 
mention the National Campaign against Honour Crimes, aimed at improving 
women’s rights in Syria and the repeal of article 548 which permitted “honour 
crimes”.  The campaign sustained by a network of NGO’s and organizations 64
working on the issue of human rights managed to carry out an on-line informa-
tion campaign, seminar and workshops and start an online petition which ob-
tained 10,254 signatures of men and women which were sent to the president, the 
prime minister, the justice minister and the Bar Association.  In 2008, the cam65 -
paign brought about a change in the law, raising punishment from one year to 
two years, still a light penalty, but definitely a successful achievement. Equally 
important has been the Personal Status Law campaign, an on-line campaign 
aimed at abrogating a draft of a new personal status law, formulated by a conser-
vative Islamic committee, which would have represented a setback for civil 
rights, especially for women.  As in the previous campaign, activists occupied 66
electronic websites, involving TV and cinema celebrities and signing petitions 
calling for the withdrawal of the law and presenting them to official of the gov-
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ernment. The widespread mobilization managed to get the draft law sent back for 
further examination.  In addition to these wide-scale campaigns, there have been 67
a number of smaller initiatives taking place since 2006, which were strongly 
based on the use of the Internet and telecommunication technology like a national 
campaign to annul an amendment of the martial law; a campaign to allow women 
to transfer their citizenship to their children; campaigns for the protection of 
young women who had been victims of rape, a campaign to lower mobile phone 
rates and to keep the country clean.  The common feature linking these new 68
forms of civic mobilization was the emphasis on social issues rather than political 
ones; they included different categories of Syrian society; and relied on tools 
such as the Internet, mobile technology and social media to carry out their initiat-
ives.  The new information and communication technologies contributed to new 69
ways of learning, organizing and coordinating actions that social movements did 
not have before. The new tools played an important role in campaigns and peti-
tions, as mentioned above, as well as being instruments for social awareness, like 
a YouTube video showing a policeman receiving a bribe (viewed 366,703 times 
and received 1,323 comments); or the case of a Facebook video in 2010 showing 
two Syrian teachers beating students, eventually obliging the Ministry of Educa-
tion to remove the teachers from their jobs.  This did not produce a change in 70
the centres of power but became a force that the Syrian regime later had to con-
front.  
To conclude, this paper may have raised more questions than it has been able to 
answer. However everyone would be hard pressed not to agree that a growing 
sense of civil and social emancipation expressed in the numerous initiatives be-
fore 2011 rejects a whole literature of neglected civil activism in Syria. Not sur-
prisingly, the events of 2011 were defined as an “Arab Awakening”, only when 
civil activism opted for radical stances. Perhaps the term “awakening” has not 
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been inappropriately used; what is wrong is to whom it is addressed. What is cer-
tain is that the field of Middle East studies is in need of a critical self-reflection 
of the literature produced thus far, of the Western categories and theories too of-
ten rigidly applied to a context that not necessarily needs to resemble to the West. 
In fact, the literature produced in this context about the informal and ordinary 
people is to say the least fragmented. And yet, in the long term, these same 
people do exercise some power and bring change through their everyday 
strategies of resistance. This type of research question would not just fill the gap 
of our literature on the Middle East and explain factors that have not been taken 
into consideration in the analysis of the Arab uprisings, but it may represent a 
determinant element for the development of new social movement theories in 
many developing countries.  
More importantly, one would hope that over time, the Arab uprisings will mark 
the end of our Western hegemonic attitude to understand others, in this case Ar-
abs, as extensions of ourselves. This does not apply to the recent events but to the 
past in general, which has been obscured from Western historical memory. As 
Emmanuel Levinas (1991) argued in Totality and Infinity, for once we recognize 
that others, the people in the Arab Street-Muslims and Christians, men and wo-
men, shopkeepers and students, soldiers and women in hijab, are not “lifeless 
signs into which we are free to read our own meanings. They are not objects 
waiting to be interpreted and illuminated by our own lights. They shine forth with 
their own lights.”  71
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